

SECRET

Approved For Release 2000/08/23 : CIA-RDP67-00059A000200080005-6

18 October 1949

MEMORANDUM FOR: MR. CHILDS

SUBJECT: Comments on Draft of Proposed Memorandum
from the DCI to the NSC Prepared by the
Office of Counsel

1. To my mind the proposed memo contains the sum of the deficiencies which were inherent in previous drafts prepared by some of the Offices of CIA, namely, it does not sufficiently protect the Director. We must fully recognize that such a step as he might take in sending a paper of this type to the NSC is really inviting a "head-rolling" contest, and that he must be in a unique position of solidarity on every word expressed by him if he takes such initiative. Thus, when the attached memorandum uses such words as "refusal" on the part of the agencies to give certain material, and "blocks" which the agencies are placing in the way of CIA fulfilling its designated mission we are lodging very serious indictments against powerful and long-established executive departments and agencies of the Government, the heads of which comprise to some degree the judicial body before whom the Director places his case, i.e., the National Security Council.

2. I believe we are on very weak grounds in criticizing the "IAC mechanism." The so-called "mechanism" for the Intelligence Advisory Committee is the procedure which we have endorsed and followed in the last few years and is not that prescribed by NSCID No. 1. In commenting on the Dulles Report, the National Security Council concurred in the observation and conclusion that the IAC was conceived soundly "as an advisory body." Nowhere in NSCID No. 1, which created the IAC, is the thought expressed that the IAC should be other than advisory in scope. Furthermore, NSCID No. 1 does not call for unanimity when the Director uses the IAC to test out the "advice and recommendations" which he may send to the National Security Council. In fact, NSCID No. 1 not only recognizes, but is sympathetic toward the view that in using the IAC the Director will not find unanimity, but rather the expression of individual agency viewpoints which will be looked upon as "non-concurrences." Hence, instead of asking for a

*Mechanism
of Unanimity*

*But not unanimity
to all or family*

Approved For Release 2000/08/23 : CIA-RDP67-00059A000200080005-6

SECRET

SECRET

Approved For Release 2000/08/23 : CIA-RDP67-00059A000200080005-6

revision of NSCID No. 1 to overcome the "board of directors" philosophy, which has controlled so much of the deliberations of the IAC, what we really need to do is to suggest that the Director take a definite stand when papers are submitted to the National Security Council for decision. It is probable that the stand of the DCI will, in practically all instances, parallel that of the majority opinion. However, even that is not obligatory and it is quite conceivable that the occasion, or occasions, may arise when the DCI in transmitting a paper to the NSC may concur in the minority viewpoint. We must also recognize that by the adoption of this procedure, which is called for in NSCID No. 1, the DCI may adopt a viewpoint which differs materially from any of the advisory concepts expressed by the members of the IAC.

3. My statements are not to be misinterpreted as saying that the National Security Council Intelligence Directives, as written, do not need revamping. My apprehension is on the point of contending that the revision of NSCID No. 1 will overcome the difficulties experienced today in our IAC dealings.

25X1A


SECRET

Approved For Release 2000/08/23 : CIA-RDP67-00059A000200080005-6